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Russian Agroholdings + Financial Capital + Land Grabbing  
≡ Global “Bread Basket”? 
Max Spoor, Oane Visser and Natalia Mamonova 
 
1. Introduction 
Russia has seen a recovery in its agricultural sector since the early 2000s, which can 
particularly be noticed in the production and exports of wheat, which was at record height in 
the years 2008-2009. Production of wheat and coarse grains in Russia is dominated by large 
farm enterprises (LFE), which are the successors of the previous kolkhozy and sovkhozy, and 
currently merging into huge “megafarms” and enterprise conglomerates or “agroholdings”. 
The latter themselves incorporate a great number of LFEs (Visser, Mamonova and Spoor, 
2012). The re-emergence of Russia as a global grain producer is being observed in an 
increasingly tense global food market, in which food price hikes occurred in 2007-2008 and 
more recently in 2010-2011, and is seen as potentially crucial. It is suggested that this region 
will become the new global “bread basket”, in particular because large tracks of land, possibly 
40-50 million hectares have been taken out of production since the early 1990s. Re-cultivation 
of these land reserves could positively contribute to resolving the “food crisis”.1 It is in this 
context that these large farm enterprises are increasingly seen in a positive light, suggesting 
that they are the ones responsible for this grain recovery, and the only way forward to solve 
the food crisis. In this paper we investigate critically this proposition, asking the question 
whether it the following “equation” is true:  
Russian agroholdings + Financial Capital + Land Grabbing ≡ global “bread basket”? 
In order to investigate the above, we will take into account various factors, such as efficiency, 
productivity, social and environmental costs of large-scale mode of production in the Russian 
context (e.g. de Schutter 2012; Deininger and Byerlee 2011, for conflicting views). Although 
not all the necessary data is available, we will conclude that this equation is a 
misrepresentation of reality, and that the current return to Soviet megalomania under capitalist 
conditions will not be sustainable in the future. This conclusion is completely different from 
the opinion that was expressed by Dr. Alex Lissitsa, President of the Ukrainian Agribusiness 
Club, in the June 2012 IAMO Forum on “Land Use in Transition” (where this paper was 
presented as keynote contribution), who argued that agroholdings were not only efficient, but 
needed to become even bigger because of having to compete with Latin American latifundia. 
In order to test the validity of our “equation”, we will analyse the emergence of the 
agroholdings, the influence of financial capital (in particular from outside the agricultural 
sector), and the process of land concentration, which is often done in the form of land 
grabbing. Combining these elements will provide inputs to answer the question whether the 
sum will lead to Russia becoming a global bread basket.  
We will argue in this paper that after having passed through a period of land reform, 
two decades after the end of the socialist era, Russia shows a remarkable degree of 
concentration in the agricultural sector of land and other assets, with possibly the fastest and 
most far-reaching corporatisation and financialisation of this sector in the world. In such a 
short period of time, Russia moved from a situation in which the sector was characterised by 
thousands of large-scale ailing and sometimes collapsing collective (kolkhozy) and state farms 
1 It is not suggested here that the “food crisis” is only caused by supply constraints, which is often argued. The 
effects if increased financialization and speculation in food and agricultural markets, and unequal access food are 
even more important (Spoor and Robbins 2012).  
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(sovkhozy), towards the dominance of a new (but in a sense continuous) form of dominant 
large agricultural enterprise, which more recently were integrated into agroholdings. The 
latter do not only include many large farms enterprises, but also input and output marketing 
companies, while finance capital external to the sector plays an increasing role.  
There is a continuity to be observed from Soviet farm enterprises (which were part of 
the АПК, or Agro-Industrial Complex) towards these new corporate enterprises and 
agroholdings. These agroholdings expand rapidly in terms of land, and as this is done often in 
shady deals (Visser, Mamonova and Spoor 2012) the term “land grabbing”, rather than “large-
scale land investments” (World Bank 2011) is seen here as more appropriate. The drive to 
diversify financial assets during and after the global crisis of 2008-2009, the predominance of 
Russian capital emerging from the energy sector, and the continued Soviet-style megalomania 
have all influenced this development (Visser and Kalb 2010; Kalb and Visser 2012; Visser, 
Mamonova and Spoor 2012).  
The paper will analyse the development of this large-scale type of agriculture in 
Russia particularly focused on grain production. After this introduction, in the second part we 
will briefly summarize the development of land reform and farm restructuring over the past 
two decades in the suddenly emerged post-Soviet transition. We will argue that there was a 
failure of land reform if one accepts that land reform should lead to asset and wealth 
distribution (Borras 2007; Lipton 2009). This means that we will look beyond the focus on the 
degree of individualisation of land use and production, that is often seen as the main criterion 
for success (Lerman, Czaki and Feder 2004; see also: Spoor and Visser 2001; Spoor 2012). 
We will show that there has been a transition from a bi-modal Soviet agrarian structure 
(kolkozy/sovkhozy versus subsidiary household plots) towards a renewed (and in that sense 
continued) one, namely with corporate mega-farms and agroholdings versus household plots, 
with a (still) relatively small individual farm sector as a third player. We will address the 
questions: how did land ownership change and land concentration occur over the past two 
decades? How was this process enabled through policy, but also through the emergence 
institutional framework? The main reason to undertake this historical analysis is not only 
because it had been a very interesting transition experience, which has drawn the attention of 
many scholars (Lerman et al. 2004; Wegren 2008, 2009; Spoor 2012; Wandel et al. 2011), but 
because Russia (together with Kazakhstan and Ukraine) forms a region that is currently seen 
as a possible global “bread basket” in terms of current and future grain (and bio-fuels) 
production. In the third part of this paper we will show that not only there has been a re-
concentration of land and productive resources, and a “consolidation” of the previous 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy into large commercial mega-farms and agroholdings, but there is also 
an increased financialization and corporatization of these (often integrated chain) farm 
enterprises. Hockmann et al. (2005) focus on their positive contribution to agricultural 
development (“breaking the vicious circle?”), but we will analyse this development more 
critically. In a recent study we undertook on oligarchs and mega-farms (Visser, Mamonova 
and Spoor 2012) we saw that there were often shady deals and non-transparent processes 
under which land shares were accumulated and land grabbing has taken place. Most of the 
land concentration and the corporatization of farm enterprises are undertaken by domestic 
capital, although there is also some foreign investment involved in these land grabs. In this 
paper we will pursue that investigation further, by looking at agroholdings (and their land 
deals) more in detail, analysing the various drivers behind this process of land, asset and 
capital concentration. We will add to this a crucial piece of analysis, namely that in spite of 
their generally “good press”, in fact there is a substantial part of the agroholdings is in 
financial difficulties, or are in a procedure of bankruptcy. 
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In the fourth part an analysis is presented about the “recovery” of the grain sector in 
Russia. Russia’s grain production was 61.7 million tons in 2009 (while it dropped in 2010 
after prolonged drought to 41.5 million tons, and recovered again to 56.2 million tons2), 
which was 9.0 percent of the world’s wheat production. However, Russia is the third wheat 
exporter in the world; in 2009 it exported 17.4 million tons of wheat, while this was only 
slightly less than the world leaders in this market, namely Canada (with 19.3 million tons) and 
the US (with 21.9 million tons), the three countries together representing nearly 40 percent of 
the world wheat market.3 This indicates the growing importance of Russia in wheat 
production and exports. Recent studies (EDB 2010) even expect within a time span of a few 
years a doubling of those production levels, although other sources are more sceptical, and 
suggest a consolidation of Russia’s production at 60 million tons of wheat and exports of 
around 20.0 million tons in the next decade (FAPRI-ISU 2011). The most recent expectation 
of the 2012 wheat harvest, again because of non-favourable climate conditions (and recent 
severe floodings in the South) was even below that of the level of 2011, possibly falling back 
to the 2008 level.4 The future role of Russia grain sector, apart from these regularly occurring 
misharvests because of droughts, will also depend on whether the large potential that can be 
re-cultivated in Russia (possibly more than 40 million hectares) will actually be dedicated to 
wheat, as originally these were areas where rye, barley and oat was produced (see part 3). 
There are tendencies for further value chain integration in the grain markets of Russia 
(as well as in Kazakhstan and Ukraine) and important investments are currently undertaken in 
grain elevators and port facilities. In combination with the already mentioned tendency of 
land concentration, we will therefore ask ourselves the question: is large/scale production, 
undertaken by corporate companies more efficient than small- and medium sized farms to 
“feed the world”? This is a widespread idea among policy makers and businessmen, but 
which is also challenged by several studies (De Schutter, 2012; HLPE, 2011). Are these 
agroholdings indeed so profitable/efficient/successful as their rapid emergence suggests at 
first sight? What are the downsides of having agriculture and particularly the wheat sector of 
Russia dominated by these huge corporate companies? In this part of the analysis we will look 
at various issues, such as efficiency and land productivity, but also to transaction costs, as 
very often horizontal and vertical integration is pursued by companies because of existing 
market deficiencies. Oligopolistic market behaviour seems to be the outcome of this process. 
We will also briefly look at issues such as growing bureaucracies in these corporate 
structures, the social conditions, the impact of de-peasantisation for the countryside, and the 
possible environmental impact of large-scale farming.  
In the concluding section we will argue that the process of land, asset and financial 
capital concentration in the agricultural, and in particular in the grain sector in Russia is 
taking place at very high speed. Russia does not seem to simply catch up with practice and 
structures of the global food regimes (McMichael 2009), but even takes the lead in some 
ways. As the managing director of the Agroholding NCH Capital said: “To some extent, 
Russia is at the forefront of this development” (McChestney 2011). Huge Russian 
agroholdings have their shares now quoted on Western stock markets, they attract investors 
from abroad, and become bigger and bigger. This author sees in these new corporate giants 
2 We use here RosStat (2012), but the 2010 figure is equal to FAOSTAT (2012); see note 3. 
3 FAOSTAT (2012), available at: www.faostat.fao.org, accessed 5 June 2012. 
4 See: http://www.world-grain.com/news/news%20home/LexisNexisArticle.aspx?articleid 
=1682457398&cck=1, accessed 17 June 2012. This source estimated the wheat output for 2012 at 54 million 
tons. However, www.bloomberg.com, of 9 August 2012, using the most recent data on water shortages, expected 
an even lower outcome, namely maximally 45-46 million tons of wheat. 
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something of a re-incarnation of former Soviet companies within the then АПК, calling them 
polemically “Collective Farm 2.0”.  
The region has substantial fertile land reserves and there is also a yield gap that can be 
reduced (World Bank 2011), which could lead to a strong expansion of particular wheat and 
coarse grains. The question is however if this will really happen, and if so at what costs and 
with which benefits this newly emerging “food regime” (McMichael 2009) is emerging in 
Russia. For instance, will it increase or decrease the effects of financial speculation in food 
markets, as we have seen in the periods 2007-08 and 2010-11, and lead to a more volatile 
prices and increased insecurity? Also the social costs of the de-peasantisation of the 
countryside should be critically looked at. The benefits might include a substantial increase in 
grain production, in particular because of the re-cultivation of large amounts of abandoned 
land. For European Russia alone these were estimated by Schierhorn et al. (2012) at 26 
million hectares between 1991 and 2009, but the economic, social and environmental costs 
might be high, and an un-sustainable mode of production is in the making. 
 
2. Was Land Reform a Failure? 
At the outset of the transition period in Russia the process of land reform and farm 
restructuring was supposed to lead, at least if we look at the advice which was given by the 
IFIs (World Bank, 1992), to a complete overhaul of the agrarian structure. As Spoor and 
Visser (2001, p. 886) stated: 
     The report argued that privately-run (family) farms by definition would be more efficient 
and productive than the existing large-scale state and collective enterprises (sovkhozy and 
kolkhozy). 
In undertaking land reform and farm restructuring the Yeltsin government chose for a “share-
based” land distribution, which was also followed in countries such as Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine (as opposed to a “plot-based” land distribution, used elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe). Individual farms that were formed in the early 1990s had some policy support, but 
the deficient and sometimes non-existing factor markets made it very hard to subsist or 
accumulate (Spoor and Visser 2001; 2004; and Visser, Mamonova and Spoor 2012).  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Weakly defined user-rights (of the shares) and the overall crisis of the post-Soviet Russian 
economy made it possible for inventive entrepreneurs, former Sovkhoz or Kolkhoz chairmen, 
other members of the rural nomenklatura, but also criminal elements to gather large numbers 
of shares. In the early stages several forms of new enterprises were formed in that way 
(Wegren 2009), such as joint-stock companies, cooperatives and “peasant associations”, 
although sometimes only changing the name plate. In Table 1 it is shown that since the early 
1990s until 2010 there has been hardly any increase in the total number of household plots, 
but their average acreage has more than doubled, with the total land area growing from 3.2 
million hectare in 1992 to 7.5 million hectare in 2010.  
The number of peasant (or individual) farms grew rapidly in the 1990s to (at least 
according to the official data, as the real number might well be 25 percent less) a maximum of 
278,600 in the year 1996 (occupying 12.4 million hectare), gradually decreasing in numbers to 
261,700 in 2010 (with a slight increase total land acreage of 16.3 million hectares). Finally, 
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the number of large farm enterprises (“agricultural companies”) has remained remarkably 
stable in the transition. While there were an estimated 25,800 sovkhozy and kolkhozy in 1991, 
by the year 2000 these had been transformed in commercial or corporate large farm 
enterprises (LFEs), of which there were around 27,600. With the bankruptcy law (1998) in 
force, an increased process of concentration followed, and in 2006 this number had already 
reduced to 22,300. Since 2003, with the new Land Code in Russia was introduced, the process 
of land concentration started to speed up. The bankruptcy law stimulated the elimination of 
those enterprises which had been non-solvent for a long time (Spoor and Visser 2004), but 
also the easy acquisition (sometimes at symbolic prices) of enterprises by capital groups or 
investors, partly to strip their assets, and partly to build up conglomerates of enterprises or 
agroholdings (see section three). 
The data in Table 1 show that land reform in Russia has not been a re-distributive one, 
as was possibly intended in the early stages of transition, or it could also confirm that this was 
not the intention at all. Indeed, a peasant (or individual) farm sector has emerged, but it has 
remained relatively small. The sector occupied 11.2 percent of agricultural land in 2010, if 
compared with the first transition year 1992 in which the peasant farm sector was practically 
still non-existent. The household sector (subsidiary plots and dacha gardens) increased its 
share from 1.6 to 5.2 percent of total agricultural land. Finally, while in 1992 the sovkhoz and 
kolkhoz farms had occupied 98.4 percent of agricultural land, their corporate heirs in 2010 still 
held an estimated respectable 83.6 percent. This seems more than has been reported in other 
sources, but it could be that the 13.9 million hectare reported by Serova (2010) as the category 
“other” should be added, lowering the share in agricultural land of agricultural companies to 
76.3 percent.  
Was land reform a failure? This is a question which has been addressed by various 
authors in different ways (Lerman et al. 2004; Wandel et al. 2011; and Wegren 2008). As the 
latter author stated some time ago: 
Russia’s contemporary land reform did not deliver on early intentions in that large 
farms continue to use most of Russia’s agricultural land. Individuals have not become 
‘masters of the land’, most rural households continue to have small land holdings 
(Wegren 2008, p. 143). 
Indeed it was a failure, because in the end it did not lead to a wealth distribution (land and 
assets) and if it did initially in the 1990s, it was reverted later-on. We will come back to this in 
the section where the continuity in terms of large farm enterprises is emphasized, and where 
also the role of the state is indicated in this process (through policies and institutional 
framework). However, it is summarized quite well in a recent statement by Ivan Bagach, head 
of the regional Duma of the Stavropol Territory5: 
The task of the state these days is to take all land and give it to the big business, thus 
leaving no means of subsistence to small farmers. When the land plots were distributed, 
we were told that the state gave land to the peasants, but in fact it took the land from the 
peasants. 
 
 
3.  Land Grabbing and Financial Capital: “Collective 2.0” Agroholdings 
Agroholdings: concentration of land and capital 
5 http://mnenia.ru/rubric/finance/na-rossiyu-nastupayut-latifundii/#opinion21142; accessed 5 June 2012. 
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It was recently estimated by Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (IKAR) in Moscow that 
agroholdings account for 25 percent of grain output in Russia (Rylko 2011) and will do so for 
40-50 percent by 2016 (EBRD 2008, p. 7), with a possible even larger role in exports. In 
comparison, in Kazakhstan, agroholdings are estimated to control even 80 percent of total 
grain output (Rylko 2011). The number of agroholdings (as well as the size of their land 
holdings) has rapidly increased since the early 2000s. According to the Russian Ministry of 
Agriculture in 2003, more than 90 agroholdings were active in 25 regions. By 2006, 319 
corporate agroholdings were already registered (Uzun et al. 2009, p. 159). There are no 
official statistics of the land areas farmed by agroholdings (as they are reported for the 
individual farm enterprises), but by mid-2008, according to an estimate of IKAR, 196 large 
agroholdings controlled 11.5 million hectares (BEFL 2010, p. 9).6 By the mid-2000s in 
various fertile Black Earth regions, such as Belgorod, Lipetsk, Voronezh and Tambov there 
was practically no ‘free’ land available that was not yet controlled by an agroholding 
(Didenko 2009). Of the over 300 agroholdings in Russia, by 2007 there were 32 with land 
holdings of over 100,000 hectares (EBRD 2008, p. 7), while according to Rylko (2011) this 
was even more than 35. At least 12 major holdings controlled each 150,000 hectares or more, 
such as Cherkizovo, Nastyusa, Prodimex, Razgulay, SAHO, Yug Rusi and others (EBRD 
2008, p. 7). 
Control over the main bottlenecks 
The market power of the agroholdings even more than their land size depends particularly on 
ownership or control over strategic bottlenecks in the food and agricultural value chains. We 
can observe that the largest agroholdings assert market power through concentrated storage, 
handling and/or processing and port facilities. The precise assets they control depend on the 
specialisation. Here we will take a closer look at storage capacity, as an understudied, but 
essential factor in the build-up of market power in the agri-business sector. Although LFEs 
generally have simple storage facilities to keep their products for a short period, some now 
have cold storage, enabling longer storage of perishables. As such, they can store their harvest 
and then sell it at the end of winter or in the spring when prices are higher.  
In fact storage facilities have become even more important. For grain, now (one of the 
major) crops of the agroholdings, we have shown earlier that the sustained increase of grain 
production was much more limited than the impressive export figures during the years 2008 
and 2009 actually suggest. As we argued earlier, until the early 1990s a larger share of the 
grain production (including coarse grains; see also section four of this paper) was used as 
animal feed. With the downfall of the animal husbandry sector (which has been slowly 
recovering during the 2000s, but still at much lower levels than during the Soviet era), more 
of domestic grain is used for human consumption (whether domestically or for export), and 
there is a growing need for more high quality storage capacity. The number of grain elevators, 
however, did not increase. According to some sources the number of elevators remained 
unchanged throughout the first decade of the 2000s, at 1147 elevators. According other 
sources grain storage capacity even declined somewhat. Storage capacity decreased in one 
year with over 10 percent from 108.2 million tons (2008) to 97 million tons (in 2009).7 
Moreover, aside from (normal) price differences between the autumn harvest time and 
the winter/spring period, in Russia price volatility is further increased due to the earlier 
6 According to an earlier estimate by IKAR in Russia 350 agroholdings (including energy companies like 
Gazprom) farmed approximately 8 million hectares (EBRD 2008, p. 7). 
7http://hipzmag.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=187:187&Itemid=15, accessed 13 August 
2012. 
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mentioned strong annual volatility in harvested amounts and due to varying changing policies 
(e.g. bans on food export, such as were introduced in 2010-2011. These policies further 
increase market power to those companies with control over storage capacity. Agricultural 
enterprises and agroholdings which do have such storage facilities have a huge advantage 
over others. Even within the group of largest agroholdings with over 100,000 hectares of land, 
substantial differences exist within the storage capacity (GAIA 2008, p. 16). The agroholding 
Black Earth Farming (BEF), with landholdings of 330,000 hectare has a storage capacity of 
60,000 tons (around 1/10th of the maximum harvest output). Trigon agro, of Swedish origin 
like BEF, has significant lower landholdings, but much more storage capacity (over 322,000 
tons), and works profitably, whereas BEF is loss making. The storage capacity of Trigon Agri 
however pales, compared with Razgulay (controlling 560,000 ha of land), which has a 1.9 
million tons grain storage capacity. 
Drivers of land concentration 
The recent “land rush” in Russia has clear characteristics of a new frontier for investors. In the 
creation of this new frontier, global factors play a role (such as the financial crisis and the 
search for an inflation hedge), but domestic factors seem to be more decisive. Also domestic 
land acquisitions predominate over those by foreign investors. After the large financial crisis 
of the late 1990s, the Russian economy has shown impressive growth rates throughout most 
of the 2000s. Demand for high quality food products, such as livestock products, has been 
continuously rising as a consequence (in contrast to the enormous crisis in this sector during 
the decade of the 1990s). An important factor on the supply side is the large amount of capital 
which the Russian oligarchs have accumulated during the earlu “piratization of Russia” 
(Goldman 2003). After having established their domination in the energy and industry sectors 
these were looking for new frontiers of investment (Visser, Mamonova and Spoor 2012). 
Whereas in the 1990s they transferred their capital to tax havens in the West, with the 
economic recovery of the 2000s this offshore capital was increasingly invested in the 
domestic economy. In the early 2000s a senior economist of the Moscow Brokerage firm 
Aton Capital Group concluded, “Russians are starting to trust Russia” and therefore “money 
is coming back” (Starobin and Belton 2002). The land rush can therefore be seen as part of 
the larger “hunt for the Next Big Thing”, a new accumulation drive that started in the 2000s 
with the privatisation of assets which were left in state-ownership in the 1990s, such as 
railways, electricity and financial services (Starobin and Belton, 2002). The Russian state 
plays an important role in enabling the boom in large-scale land acquisitions, in legal terms by 
adopting the 2002 land law allowing free sale of land and, even more importantly, by fiscal 
policies that lowered taxes and increased subsidised loans for agricultural companies. 
The fact that the current recovery of the agricultural sector runs parallel with increased 
large-scale land acquisitions and the predominance of huge agroholdings is sometimes 
portrayed as an inevitable process and/or representing the most efficient mode of farming for 
Russia, by investors and authorities alike. While it is true that in the Russian landscape some 
crops allow for a high degree of mechanisation and economies of scale, there are also various 
diseconomies of scale associated with these large farm enterprises (Nikulin 2005; Visser 
2006; 2008), such as those related to monitoring and management costs. Another justification 
for large-scale land acquisitions and mega-farming given by the major actors in Russia is that 
the rural population is not willing to take up independent farming, that small or medium 
private family farms are not a feasible form of production, or do not have the finance to 
expand and modernise production. “Today only agro-industrial holdings can be profitable in 
farming, because it requires huge financial resources”, stated Zorigto Sakhanov, chairman of 
Agro-Invest Group, the subsidiary of Swedish Black Earth Farming (Bush 2008). Indeed, the 
growth of private farms has been below expectations. However, it is important to stress that 
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many of the farmers face obstacles which are not simple natural problems related to their size, 
but a direct problem of a political economy (and government policy) targeted solely at large-
scale farming (Visser 2008). In that sense their contribution is even substantial, against all 
odds (see section four). The lack of investment in extension services, as well as the large-scale 
nature of input and output channels, form obstacles for private peasant farms. Furthermore, 
some regional authorities have even set limitations on the minimum size of land deals, such as 
in Krasnodar Krai where there is a threshold of 300 hectares for land deals, hindering the 
emergence and expansion of small and medium sized farms (Visser and Spoor 2011).  
A very important factor that favours large-scale farming and further vertical and 
horizontal integration is the Russian financial system. There is an urgent lack of accessible 
finance or credit, from within the sector, for agricultural companies and even more for peasant 
farms. Obtaining loans is virtually only possible through take-over and capitalisation by rich 
investors who have built up their capital in another sector, or via state subsidised credit. Most 
commercial banks are more vehicles for the investment projects of oligarchs than accessible 
sources of credit. Interest rates are very high and agricultural land is mostly not accepted as 
collateral. Furthermore, banks are generally not much oriented toward agriculture.  
However, from the early 2000s, the state has increased finance for the agricultural 
sector. A network of state-owned and operated banks for agribusiness was set up, but in some 
regions these bank branches were only established when agriculture had already virtually 
disappeared. State subsidised loans have been targeted predominantly towards large farm 
enterprises (LFEs), and within this group, towards the largest and most successful ones. For 
instance, Uzun (2005) states that “1.4 percent of the largest corporate farms received 22.5 
percent of all subsidies”. Also, the more indirect forms of subsidisation seem to stimulate 
mostly the largest LFEs.8 Various requirements of the loans, such as the need for matching of 
resources and often brief repayment terms, tend to produce a bias in the loan portfolio in 
favour of LFEs and agroholdings. Moreover, there are calls for even more privileges for LFEs 
and agroholdings, such as to offer favourable conditions for acquiring land and other 
resources from inefficient agricultural enterprises, support for exports, and favourable 
conditions for importing inputs needed for agricultural production (Berezhnoi 2002). Some of 
such privileges already exist in a more informal form at regional level. A policy favouring 
large scale investments in Russia is of course not unique. As for instance Daniel (2012, p. 
706) states, many countries have offered such incentives to attract investment in farmland, 
including duty exemptions, full or partial tax holidays, or tax rate reductions. In the specific 
Russian context, it is difficult to develop agriculture without investors from outside the sector, 
in the absence of a financial system and institutions that support the various actors in 
agricultural production. Whereas in the 1990s, the few investors in agriculture and land were 
mostly coming from agribusiness (food processors, food wholesalers, or providers of inputs 
for farming), now investors often do not have any existing link to the sector, and finance 
becomes detached from agricultural production.  
Motivations by actors 
The precise motivations of outside investors or oligarchs to acquire land are not easy to 
discover since the whole process is highly non-transparent, not least for the villagers, who 
often know little more than that “a rich investor from Moscow” obtained their land 
(D’Hamecourt 2010, p. 13). However, it is clear, as we will elaborate below, that the current 
land rush cannot be explained by economic incentives or rising food demand only, and needs 
8 However, it should be noted that by the mid 2000s the national budget for the first time since the mid-1990s set 
aside a substantial amount of subsidies for household plots and private farms (Wegren 2007). 
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further analysis and disentanglement. Several authors have argued that the idea of a rapidly 
growing global population and rising food demand as an explanation for rising food prices 
and subsequently the drive for land acquisitions is a mystification of reality (Jouko and 
Granberg 2011; De Schutter 2012). This is clearly also the case for Russia. Except from the 
more obvious economic reasons for investment, such as increased demand for livestock 
products, and aspects of investment portfolio management (integration, differentiation and 
risk-spreading), there are several other motivations for actors to undertake investments. The 
following will be discussed: high subsidies, speculation, state pressure and state-business 
agreements, tax evasion and money laundering. 
Subsidies and privileges: Acquiring land and investing in agriculture has been made 
attractive by the policy of the Russian government. Since the early 2000s the state has 
stimulated agriculture through a range of instruments such as a debt restructuring programme, 
the establishment of a state-financed agricultural bank, subsidised crop insurance 
programmes, simplified and lowered taxes on agriculture, and subsidised loans for capital 
investment (Wegren 2007, p. 517). Whereas in the 1990s subsidies for the agricultural sector 
were sharply curtailed, under Putin, from 2006 onwards, agriculture became one of the four 
priorities of the “national project”. The government set ambitious goals for domestic food 
security, targeting first of all the livestock sector, which had experienced a most dramatic 
decline during the 1990s. As a result, cheap, state-subsidized credit became available for 
investments in livestock and especially dairy production.  
Western observers often hasten to characterise state intervention in Russia as a legacy 
of, or return to, the Soviet past, but it is more productive to see it as an example of the wider 
global tendency of various states to stimulate their agricultural sectors (Daniel 2011). 
Whereas in some countries subsidies focus on biofuel production (such as in the US and in 
Germany), in Russia, as a major fossil fuel exporter and a weakened livestock producer, the 
subsidies focus on the latter sector. Much of the privileges to the (mostly large) agroholdings 
are of an informal, and therefore non-transparent nature, and consequently difficult to 
pinpoint.9 However, there is substantial anecdotal evidence. To give one example of a large 
agroholding Yug Rossi: one of the reasons that it invests in agriculture seems to be a tacit 
agreement with the regional authorities, similar to the deal President Putin made with the 
oligarchs. The Yug Rossii investors made huge profits in the 1990s, partly due to privileged 
tax position granted by the authorities. In return, the authorities now want the company 
leaders to invest in the countryside.10 New subsidized investment credits for domestic and 
export elevators seem to benefit especially the largest agroholdings, as indicated for instance 
by the rapid investment growth in construction of elevators by Cherkizovo, one of the largest 
agroholdings in Russia (Rylko 2011).  
Import restrictions: The 1990s were characterised by relatively free imports, targeted at 
guaranteeing cheap food for the urban population. However, by the mid-2000s when the 
oligarchs started to enter the agricultural sector, numerous changes in the import regulations 
took place which favour domestic agriculture, and in particular the position of the 
agroholdings. For sugar, a flexible rate import tariff up to 270 USD per ton was announced. 
The import duty on rice increased from a 10 percent import duty to 120 USD per ton. Also, 
import tariffs on various dairy and meat products were markedly increased (Rylko 2011). It 
has been suggested that these import restrictions were influenced by the agroholdings, through 
9  It is still to be seen how the subsidies will change in view of the recent WTO-membership of Russia (July 
2012). 
10 This analysis is based on informal conversations by O. Visser with a Russian consultant at the consultancy 
firm Yugagrofond in Rostov, autumn 2002. 
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aggressive lobbying (Hervé 2007). It is relevant to note that the first branch of livestock 
production which the large private agroholdings entered was the poultry sector. It seems to be 
no coincidence that the poultry market was also the first to benefit from import quota. When 
agroholdings started to enter other branches of the livestock sector, other import quota on 
livestock products (most notably pig farming) followed subsequently. 
Speculation and land conversion: Land brokers and representatives of agroholdings searching 
for investment widely mention the expected value appreciation of agricultural land in Russia. 
Also, part of the land is obtained in order to sell it off later with a large premium as land for 
construction sites: 
I have, (…), tried to cultivate cabbage, on 20.000 hectares, for a real estate agent. He 
wanted it in ownership, at least, the right of usage. But he had to cultivate it, otherwise 
he would not get it (...). Just what I thought: at least 50 to 80 percent of his territory is 
now expansion area for construction for Moscow for the next 25 years. He knew that 
already by then. Thus, yes, for him it was just to have it, due to its location in Moscow 
[region]… (Interview with Han van Riel, 16 November 2011, The Netherlands).11 
 
Pressure by the government: Furthermore, many political and other, often hidden, motives 
seem to play a role, such as creating loyalty and political support among regional governors 
and a tacit agreement with the Kremlin, which seems to have promised not to investigate the 
dubious practices of the oligarchs in return for their investment in the countryside (Boldyrev, 
2001, p. 21). Interviews with consultants in the sector suggest that regional authorities made 
agreements with the largest oligarchs that the latter should invest in the cumbersome 
agricultural sector in return for earlier or forthcoming privileges such as tax breaks, cheap 
credit or other forms of state support (Visser 2008). For instance, one investor, the director of 
a fur factory described by Kalugina and Fadeeva (2009, p. 165), invested in a near bankrupt 
farm enterprise only after multiple requests by the district authorities, with promises of state 
support and privileges for its development. The investor described the interaction:  “The 
district head insisted that I who come there [to invest]. He said ‘nobody except you can revive 
this enterprise’. I tried several times to run away from it”. A German investor even stated that 
“the land was almost forced on us” (Winter 2012). 
Tax evasion and money laundering: Furthermore, tax evasion, and probably money 
laundering, seems to play a role (Boldyrev 2001). Agriculture is a complex sector, with large 
fluctuations in production and profitability year to year, which allowed for extensive creative 
accounting already in the Soviet period (Visser and Kalb 2010). Furthermore, the tax on 
agricultural production is low to virtually zero. 
Tensions and bankruptcies within the agroholding sector 
Within the literature on agroholdings there is a strong focus on their emergence and 
expansion, or even a one-sided focus on the most successful ones and on aspects of 
agricultural modernization. However, there is hardly any attention for the many agroholdings 
which face financial difficulties, let alone on the ones which have failed, gone through a 
bankruptcy procedure and even disappeared from the sector.  In-depth critical research on 
agroholdings is still rare but those studies available in Russia give a rather mixed picture, and 
certainly do not reflect overall success. Guriev and Rachinsky (2004) argue that the holdings 
of Russian oligarchs do not show a higher productivity than other enterprises, while their 
11 The authors want to acknowledge here support from Michelle Steggerda, honours student at the Department of 
Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, who conducted this interview.   
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growth in productivity is higher. Clarke (2004), who based himself on extensive case studies 
in various enterprises, states that innovation in these holdings is very limited. He speaks about 
holdings as largely a continuation of the Soviet firm. The few studies on the efficiency of 
agroholdings also do not support a merely positive evaluation. Hockmann, Bokusheva and 
Bezlepkina (2007) reporting on a study in Orel, showed that agroholdings are doing worse 
than independent farm enterprises. A later study in Belgorod, Hahlbrock and Hockmann 
(2011) suggests that agroholdings do better on some accounts.12 Our first explorative web-
search (see table below) on the financial state of agroholdings, gives quite a different picture 
than the one suggested for instance by the success stories on which the media focus, with 
titles such as “Russian agriculture soon to kill of US agriculture”, “Companies turn 
Collectives into profitable businesses” (Chazan 2001), and the possible role of foreign 
investment in such development (Kandell 2009). Among the group of 25 of the largest 
agroholdings in Russia (with each controlling at least 100,000 hectares of land) at least 8 have 
experienced severe financial problems, with some of them being forced to sell their assets 
and/or go through bankruptcy procedures. However, for some of the other agroholdings in this 
group no data about their financial situation was available (Table 2).  
 
[Table 2] 
 
The case of Ivolga, the largest agroholding in Russia, is illustrative. This agroholding controls 
700,000 hectares of land in Russia and 800,000 hectares in Kazakhstan. With its immense 
landholdings of in total 1.5 million hectares it is the largest agroholding in the world.13 Like 
many of the largest Russian agroholdings it focuses predominantly at grain production. 
However, in the words of Angus Selby, an agricultural market analyst at a London Hedge 
Fund; “They are the largest single entity in the world, but they have very low productivity” 
(Orange 2011). Ivolga currently experiences severe financial problems and is negotiating with 
Royal Bank of Scotland, which leads its creditors, to restructure a US$ 300 million loan it had 
received in 2007. Furthermore, it has offered its equity for sale as even the debt restructuring 
will be insufficient to keep this giant company afloat.   
Among the ‘smaller’ agroholdings (which are not in the top 25) our research (focused 
on the brief period from 2009- mid 2012) also showed numerous cases of agroholdings that 
are highly indebted or are involved are in the process of a bankruptcy. Thus while there is a 
forefront of (apparently) successful and expanding agroholdings, there is also (a grossly 
overlooked) ‘cemetery’ of ailing and bankrupt ones, which needs to be taken into account to 
make a balanced assessment of the emergence of sometimes huge agroholdings, to which 
McChesney (2011) already referred to a “Collective 2.0”, suggesting that they were largely 
upgraded (2.0) Soviet farm enterprises. 
Agricultural companies, the larger they become, also become bureaucratic and are 
likely to incur large information, monitoring and governance costs. Hence, this should be 
taken into account in the studies on allocative and technical efficiency, and land productivity 
12 They conclude: “The result is twofold: on the one hand the conclusion can be verified that the technological 
and managerial innovations introduced by agroholdings do not necessarily increase the efficiency of 
agroholdings. On the other hand we could show that agroholdings are due to technical change the driving force 
of the shift of the production frontier.” 
13 It leaves the Argentinia agroholding El Tejar, with its 1.2 million hectares at a considerable distance.    
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in the different farm enterprise types. Rylko (2011) of IKAR in Moscow, in a presentation 
about the importance of agroholdings in the grain market even jokingly suggested that they 
might have installed many post-Soviet departments, such as that of “hoof-running 
monitoring”, “field-theft accounting” and “strategic weather planning division”, increasing 
monitoring and management costs. Clarke (2004) showed that post-Soviet management 
methods are prominent in the supposedly corporate capitalist enterprises. It is therefore 
questionable whether the large-scale companies, which have accumulated much land, will 
become the drivers of a new global “bread basket” which is sometimes suggested. Indeed 
there is much land “available” to be re-cultivated in Russia (which does not mean inhabited, 
or without “owner”), because it was taken out of production mainly during the 1990s, but this 
does not simply mean that Russia can easily increase its wheat production, and certainly not if 
this has to be done largely by the agroholdings. Grazhdaninova and Lerman (2004), in their 
study on allocative and technical efficiency of large corporate farms concluded that “The low 
productivity of Russian agriculture is mainly attributable to management factors, and not to 
technological or allocative factors”, while Rylko (2011) remarked: “longterm technical and 
managerial efficiency of agroholdings is highly questionable”. If we would include social 
variables (such as employment and viability of rural communities) and sustainability into 
account, Alexander Nikulin recently remarked14: 
Russia is on the way to the haciendas and the latifundias ...while post-kolkhozes were 
aimed to preserve the rural community, the modern raiders have been acquiring the 
most delicious pieces that could bring high returns on investments. The social sphere, 
the diversity of agro-production – are not the point of raiders’ interest. For example, in 
the Kuban region, everything is oriented on market conjuncture there. What is profitable 
on the market now? Making oil from maize and sunflower! And, currently, the whole 
region is reoriented on plantation of maize and sunflowers. The milk production is not 
highly profitable these days, consequently, all cows of the region have been going under 
the knife. As a result, the Kuban region, where you can grow almost everything, has 
been turning rapidly to an agrarian mono-territory during the last five - seven years. 
This is harmful for soil. It is necessary to maintain agricultural diversity, alternate crop 
rotation. Nevertheless, companies, that came to the territory, do not respect the land and 
local communities. They aim to ensure their high and quick profits and nothing else. 
 
4. Russia, Agroholdings and Grain: Re-emerging ‘Bread Basket’? 
Russia has recently become one of the main wheat exporters of the world, next to Canada and 
the US. In 2009 it exported 16.8 million tons of wheat, although it nearly did not export wheat 
in 2010 after drought and misharvests, with the government installing an export ban (2010-
11). Has Russian wheat production really recovered, or even stronger, is growing fast? Let us 
look more in detail to the available (and unfortunately not always consistent) data. In this case 
we used FAOSTAT data as our prime source, but realize that other sources such as RosStat 
provide similar but not always the same data. Three observations can be made while looking 
at the data presented in Table 3. First, there was a clear downward trend during the years 
1992-1999, namely from 46.2 million tons to 31.0 million tons, although with fluctuations, 
troughs and peaks. The lowest production was in 1998, namely 27.0 million tons, while the 
year before there was a peak harvest, with 44.3 million tons.  
14 Interview with A. Nikulin, Russkiy Reporter (Russian Reporter), No. 14 (243), 11/04/2012; Available at 
http://rusrep.ru/article/2012/04/11/nikulin, accessed 20 April 2012. 
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These fluctuations are largely to be explained by the influence of recurrent droughts, 
which are estimated to occur once in four years, while also the disruption of the economy in 
the 1990s negatively influenced output, in particular through lower yields per hectare. Second, 
in the following decade, from 2001-2010 a clear upward trend is noticeable, with output 
increasing to even more than 60 million tons in 2008 and 2009, although again with severe 
fluctuations and low output years because of droughts, such as in 2003, 2006 and 2010. 
However, the output level of the trough years of the 2000s is close to that of the peak years of 
the 1990s. The 2011 and 2012 wheat harvests are estimated at 56.2 and 54.0 million tons 
respectively. Third, this upwards trend is coherent with the decrease in imports and increase 
in exports. Since 2002 Russia became an important exporter of wheat, with a total of 10.3 
million tons (see Figure 1).  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
   
With various fluctuations, following weak or strong output years, imports reduced to near 
zero levels, while exports were reported at nearly 17 million tons.15 The very bad harvest of 
that year, and the rapidly increasing world market prices gave rise to an export ban of the 
Russian government, which led to nearly no exports for the 2010-11 post-harvest year. This 
ban was renewed in September 2010, and only after in 2011 Russia retook wheat exports, 
which are estimated at more than 20 million tons, making Russia the second wheat exporter in 
the world after the US. Fourth, the increase in production is a combination with an increase in 
harvested acreage and slightly improved yields. The harvested areas was in 2008 and 2009 
was even more than 26 million hectares, an estimated 2 million hectares more than the top 
years 1992, 1993 and 1997 in the previous decade. The yields improved from 1.6 tons/ha to 
2.0 tons/ha, which is substantial but still much lower than Russia’s competitors, such as 
Canada and the US. Fifth, domestic use or demand for wheat, calculated by taking yearly 
output (Y) – (Export-Import) shows violent fluctuations, but on average remains the same for 
the first and the second decade. In conclusion, there is a gradual improvement in grain output, 
which is translated, in spite of violent fluctuations (caused by recurrent droughts) in increased 
exports of wheat to world markets (Figure 1). 
In order to understand this development more in detail, we asked ourselves who 
actually produced wheat in Russia over the past two decades? In Table 3 we can see its 
development. Household plots are (not surprisingly) hardly used for wheat production, and 
therefore the contribution of this sector is practically negligible. However the contribution of 
peasant farms (and individual entrepreneurs) has rapidly grown and was nearly constant at a 
level between 22-23 percent in the years 2009-2011.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
Yield differences between peasant farms and agricultural companies are relatively small, as 
can be shown in Figure 2, which depicts the annual development of wheat yields during the 
period 1990-2011. While most of the fluctuations in average wheat yields can be explained by 
15 Various reports speak about 21.3 million tons for 2009, although sometimes it is unclear is fiscal years are 
used (from July-June) or calendar years. 
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weather conditions, it can also be seen that peasant farms have slightly closed the yield gap 
between their category of farms and agricultural companies (Figure 2).  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Coarse Grain Production Decreased Dramatically 
What can be observed clearly is that the reported dramatic downfall in cultivated areas in 
Russia was not in the production of wheat, but actually has taken place in coarse grain, in part 
because these are more closely related with the animal husbandry sector, which collapsed in 
the early 1990s (see Table 4).  
 
[Table 4] 
 
Actually, a large share of the cultivated land, namely around 25.0 million hectares which was 
taken out of production, was previously dedicated to the production of coarse grains, such as 
rye, barley, oat (which all three dropped dramatically) and corn (that increased somewhat). 
This is not land that used to be planted with wheat, and it is questionable whether this large 
“available” acreage will be possible to be converted into wheat lands, such as is suggested by 
Schierhorn et al. (2012), who note that in the European part of Russia there is 26 million 
hectares of land that can be re-cultivated). It is also questionable whether the abandoned land 
can be converted into cultivated land without a large GHG emission, as they have become 
large carbon sinks after more than 10-15 years of having left fallow (Kurganova et al. 2007).  
A detailed study by Meyfroidt et al. (2012) confirms these risks, and concludes that only 8.7-
8.9 million hectare can be re-cultivated “with relatively lower environmental costs”, which 
strengthens our argument that much of the “available” land in Russia will not be re-cultivated 
in the near future if not with substantial environmental costs, and even then not likely to 
produce with high yields.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have confirmed, but also qualified the observation that Russia has 
“recovered” as a global grain producer and exporter. Indeed, wheat production has grown to 
higher levels, and although there are still substantial fluctuations in total output, primarily 
caused by differing weather conditions, the trough years in the second decade of transition are 
actually close to the peak years in the first decade. Imports have dropped to negligible levels, 
and in the top years 2008 and 2009 exports went up to nearly 17 million tons of wheat, 
transforming Russia into the 3rd global exporter of wheat. The wheat acreage remained rather 
constant (22-24 million hectares) although in 2008-2009 there was an additional 2 million 
hectares harvested, compared with previous years.  
Around 40 million hectares of arable land, mostly planted with cereals and leguminous 
crops were taken out of production in the 1990s, particularly affecting the production of 
coarse grains. There is no “recovery” in that part of Russian grain production as yet, as the 
production acreage dropped from 35 million in 1992 to around 10 million hectares in 2010, 
and production of mainly rye, barley and oat fell from 57 million tons to 17 million tons 
during the same period. This is partly due to the enormous crisis that occurred in the livestock 
sector during the 1990s with consequently lower demand, which -with economic growth, and 
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increased incomes- slightly recovered during the second half of the 2000s. In conclusion, the 
press reports (sometimes supported by academic studies) that Russia will soon be the global 
“bread basket” are exaggerated. 
   Secondly, land reform has failed to produce a diversified farm structure in Russia, 
and to promote a real wealth transfer to (and creation of) peasant farms. In that sense it failed 
or at least was more recently, with land grabbing practices by large farm enterprises and 
domestic (or foreign) investors and capital groups, it was largely reverted. In fact, there is a 
high degree of continuity in the Russian farm or agrarian structure, in which large farm 
enterprises became the heirs of the Soviet kolkhozy and sovkhozy, and a relatively small 
peasant farm sector, that co-exist with millions of household plots. Further concentration of 
land and other assets emerged since the early part of the 2000s, in particular after the 
implementation of the bankruptcy law of the late 1990s, and the land law of the early 2000s. 
Insolvent agricultural enterprises were declared bankrupt, but also many were absorbed by 
emerging agroholdings that were integrating vertically and horizontally, often with “outside” 
capital from powerful capital groups and oligarchs. We have analyzed the drivers of and 
motivations behind this concentration of assets, in particular land, but also of other important 
parts of the food and agricultural value chains, which include attractive government policies 
for companies, investment diversification and the absence for agricultural enterprises (and 
even more the peasant farms) to access finance within the sector. Furthermore, this paper 
focused on the largest agroholdings, showing that at least one third of them were in financial 
difficulties, or in procedure for bankruptcy. This is important, as it is incorrectly suggested 
that these megaholdings are the success formula for Russian agriculture. Financialization, 
often with capital outside the agricultural and agro-processing sectors, is a key factor in the 
process of the merging of agricultural and other companies into holdings, and Russia seems to 
be at the forefront in this process, with some of its major agroholdings being quoted at the 
London stock exchange, making the distance between investment funds and producer ever 
larger. 
 Thirdly, and finally, the agroholdings and large farm enterprises are largely 
dominating the grain sector in Russia, and with their increased investment in storage, elevator 
and port facilities their market power is increasing fast. The failed land reform actually 
contributed to land and asset concentration, by creating land shares with weak property rights 
in the early 1990s. This became clear in the early 2000s when millions of shares were quite 
quickly concentrated in the hands of few, with little compensation to the owners, and very 
often in shady deals in collusion with local authorities (Visser, Mamonova, and Spoor 2012). 
If we look at the development of land productivity for wheat, and compare the peasant farm 
sector and the sector of agricultural companies (not differentiated between LFEs and 
Agroholdings), we see that the “yield gap” between the two is relatively small. The peasant 
farms have even able to catch up somewhat, in spite of all the obstacles they face, and the 
absence of supportive policies towards them. We also indicated that with the higher yields of 
agricultural companies, one should take into account the high monitoring costs, while also the 
environmental costs are likely to be higher than with peasant farms (see HLPE 2011, Spoor 
and Robbins 2012). Finally, although these last aspects need much more study, the re-
emerging megalomania in the agricultural sector in Russia is also seen as detrimental for a 
viable development of its country-side, in particular regarding the social conditions.  
 
The Hague/Nijmegen, 16 August 2012 
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TABLE 1 
 
Coarse Grain Acreage and Production (1992-2010) 
 
 
1992 1996 2000 2005 2010
Harvested Area Million Hectares 35.0 25.9 19.6 17.3 10.5
Production Million Tons 56.9 32.3 29.3 28.3 17.1
Yield Ton/Ha 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.6  
Source: FAOSTAT (2013b) The Agricultural Production domain;  RosStat (2013a) Gross Harvest of 
Crops by Different Types of Agricultural Producers provides similar, but not always the same data. 
 
TABLE 2  
Russian Land Reform and Farm Restructuring 1992-2011 
Agricultural Land 1992 1996   2000   2005   2010 2011 
                        Peasant farms    
Amount  50 278,600 263,700 267,500 261,700 260,5 
Land  (x million ha) 0.002 12.4 15.4 14.9 16.3 16.6 
Average size of 1 unit 
(ha) 
40 40 60 60 60 60 
HH plots  
Amount (x million) 16.4 16.0 15.9 15.9 16.2 16.2 
Land  (x million ha) 3.2 5.7 6.2 7 7.5 7.6 
Average size of 1 unit 
(ha) 
0.20 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.47 
Agricultural companies  
Amount  25,800 n/a 27,600 25,300 22,500 n/a 
Land (x million ha) 193.2 174.8 149.7 130.8 121.3 120.1 
Average size of 1 unit 
(ha) 
7490 n/a 5420 5170 5390 n/a 
Sources: For agricultural companies in 2005 the available data of 2006 are used, for 1996 
those available for 1997 (SNG STAT, 1994; 1999). Most sources such as SNG STAT and 
RosStat, contradict each other on various accounts. For the second decade we used State 
(National) Report on the State and Land Use in the Russian Federation in 2011.  
     
TABLE 3 
           Wheat Production by Companies, Households and Peasant Farms (1990-2012) 
(in million tons) 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural 
companies 49,6 45,2 30,0 32,7 24,7 31,1 43,5 36,9 35,4 49,7 31,8 42,9 28,9 
Peasant 
Farms 0,00 0,9 2,1 2,1 2,2 3,3 6,9 8,3 9,2 13,8 9,5 12,9 8,6 
HHs 0,01 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,2 
All 
Categories 49,6 46,2 32,1 34,8 27,0 34,5 50,6 45,4 44,9 63,8 41,5 56,2 37,7 
21 
 
Source: RosStat (2013a). Agriculture, hunting and forestry/Gross harvest of crops by different types of 
agricultural producers.  
 
  TABLE 4 
Financial difficulties amongst the largest agroholdings in Russia (2009-2011) 
 
Origin Landholdings 
(ha in Russia) 
Financial state Agroholding Outcome 
Kaz/Ru 700,000 
(+ 800,000 in Kaz) 
Financial difficulties; 
Defaulted on a 300 
million US$ loan 
Ivolga Holding Shares for sale 
Ru 570,000  GK Prodimex  
Ru 463,000 Huge debts (2009) Razgulai  
Ru 460,000  Napko  
Ru 450,000 Huge debts (2011) Zolotoi Kolos Bankruptcy procedure 
of several enterprises 
of the holding 
Ru 420,000  Yug Rusi  
Ru 400,000 Huge debts (2009) VAMIN Tatarstan Take over (?) 
Ru 394,800 Huge losses and 
decrease in 
production (2010) 
Krasny Vostok 
Agro 
Recovered 
Ru 376,700 Huge Debts (2010) Sibirski Agrarnyi 
Holding 
Has been paying its 
debt by taking a credit 
of Rosselkhozbank 
Ru/Ukr 360,400  Valars Group  
Kaz/Ru 350,000 Huge debts Nastyusha Bankruptcy 
procedures 
Swedish 330,000 Unprofitable Black Earth 
Farming 
Major restructuring, 
small profit in 2012 
Ru 260,000  Rusagro  
Ru 221,200  Agrosila Group  
Ru 200,000 Huge debts Mayak Bankruptcy procedure, 
criminal case 
Ru 200,000  Inteko-Agro  
Lit 198,000  Lupus Holdings 
(Volga 
farming/Redland) 
 
Swedish 161,000 Unprofitable. Alpcot 
Agro acquired the  
bankrupt Landkom.  
Alpcot Agro Major change of 
management 
Ru 160,000  Pava  
Ru 155,000  Avangard-Agro  
Ru 164,500  RAV Agro-Pro Acquired by Czech 
PPF Company (2011) 
Swedish 130,100  Trigon Agri  
Ru 120,000 Huge debts APK-OGO Bankruptcy procedure 
Ru 109,500 A number of the 
holding’s enterprises 
are unprofitable 
Stoilenskaya Niva Sale of unprofitable 
enterprises 
Ru  100,000  IPF-AGRO  
 
Source:  Own web research. The size of the landholdings are based on the top 25 of agroholdings by 
RBK (2009), with some updates based on own web search. Estimates on the landholdings of 
agroholdings differ (one source (RT 2013) for instance does not mention Ivolga and ranks Prodimex 
(here number 2) as the largest landholder), and landholdings changes rapidly, therefore this top-25 is 
indicative. The agroholdings in this table all have landholdings of over 100,000 ha, but according to 
some of the estimations recently 32 agroholdings have holdings over 100,000 ha. 
22 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Production and Export/Import of Wheat (1992-2010) 
 
-30.000.000
-20.000.000
-10.000.000
0
10.000.000
20.000.000
30.000.000
40.000.000
50.000.000
60.000.000
70.000.000
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Production Exports-Imports
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2013a,b), Composed based on the data from the FAOSTAT Agricultural Trade 
domain and Agricultural Production domain  
 
FIGURE 2: Wheat Yields by Different Farm Categories (1990-2011) 
 
  
 
Source: RosStat (2013b) Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry / Crop Yelds.  Note: It should be 
mentioned that the figures for peasant farmers for 1990 and 1991 are rather unreliable as their number 
was still extremely small. 
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FIGURE 3: Production and Export of Wheat: Russia and the World 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2013a,b). Composed based on the data from the FAOSTAT Agricultural 
Trade domain and Agricultural Production domain.    
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